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Summary 
 
With the onset of the new millennium, the longstanding need for reform of the 
United Nations system has gained new momentum. Efficiency gains and better 
coordination are desirable, though not sufficient to bring about improvement in 
international relations. It could therefore make sense to look for institutional 
innovations that would upgrade the pressing tasks of environmental and 
development policy in the eyes of national governments, international 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, improve the institutional 
setting for the negotiation and implementation of new agreements and action 
programs, and strengthen the action capacity of the developing countries on 
these matters.  
The present paper points to and elaborates the need for a »World Environment 
and Development Organization« within the United Nations system, and outlines 
the shape it might be given. The intention here is to carry the debate, which has 
made considerable headway, into the science of politics and development. How 
will the expert community in the field of foreign relations and development 
cooperation, based on their theories and empirical knowledge, respond to the 
proposal?  
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1. BACKGROUND 
Probably no one would award international environmental policy a summa cum 
laude. Natural scientists tend more to paint a bleak picture boding little good for 
the future. Climatologists, for instance, expect average global temperature to 
increase by 2oC (medium IPCC scenario) and sea levels to rise on average by 
up to one meter in the coming century; biologists estimate that between three 
and 130 plant and animal species die out day for day; water experts anticipate 
rapidly increasing water stress and water scarcity, etc. (cf. Brown et al. 2000, 
Gleick 1993, Heywood/Watson 1995, IPCC 1996, Lyke/Fletcher 1992, Meyers 
1993, UNEP 1999). In view of this creeping global ecological crisis international 
environmental regimes have become one of the preferred fields on which the 
disciplines of international relations and development cooperation have focused 
their attention, not least with an eye to policy advice and consulting.i  
For some time now claims have been heard in science and politics that real 
progress can be made here only through a more or less fundamental reform of 
the system of international institutions, in particular by creating a new UN 
specialized agency concerned in essence (though not necessarily exclusively) 
with environmental problems. In 1998, in a policy paper the Bonn-based 
Development and Peace Foundation spoke out in favor of a new UN 
organization of this sort (Biermann/Simonis 1998). The intent of the present 
contribution is to more precisely ground a respective proposal before the forum 
of political science and development cooperation - and invite its members to join 
us in debating it. 
A biographical report on the issue of a global environment organization would 
go beyond the space available to us here; we can cite only a few key data as a 
means of illustrating the debate and the broad political effects it has unfolded. 
One of the best-known initiatives in the Anglo-Saxon literature is that advanced 
by Daniel C. Esty, a specialist in international law, who in 1994, in Greening the 
GATT, proposed a global environment organization, envisioned in the overall 
context of his book as a counterpole to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
(Esty 1994a, b, 1996; see also Runge et al.1994). Esty's organization would be 
concerned above all with global environmental goods like the oceans and the 
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atmosphere, and he seems intent on endowing this agency with far-reaching 
competences. The North-South compromise reached at the 1992 Rio de 
Janeiro conference - i.e. that environment and development are inseparable - 
would, for Esty, in fact tend more to decouple "environment" from 
"development." On Esty's initiative, a "Global Environmental Governance 
Dialogue" of experts came together in 1999 and extended to the public an 
"Invitation to Dialogue" (1999). 
Meanwhile many politicians and governments also see a new body as a 
potential solution. In 1999 Renato Ruggiero, the Executive Director of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), caused a stir by calling for a World Environment 
Organization as a counterbalance to the WTO (Ruggiero 1999) - an unlikely 
initiative coming from a top-level bureaucrat in view of the usual inclination of 
bureaucracies to widen their own competences when in doubt. No doubt the 
debate on the need to integrate environmental standards into the WTO regime 
(Helm 1996, Biermann 1999) played a role here. But as early as in 1998 the 
French President Jacques Chirac joined the proponents of a world environment 
agency,ii and the speculation now is that this might become one of the goals 
proposed by US vice-president Al Gore in the current presidential election 
campaign with an eye to showing environmental leadership. 
Still, it is Germany that has been seen as the main international proponent of a 
new UN specialized agency since Chancellor Kohl, in the mid-1990s, spoke out 
quite unexpectedly in favor of an "Environmental Security Council," a proposal 
that was followed in 1997 by the call for a "global umbrella organization for 
environmental issues, with the United Nations Environment Programme as its 
major pillar" iii, and is now set to be further pursued by Germany's new Red-
Green government.iv And so a statement made on January 25, 1999, by the 
environmental-policy spokeswoman of the SPD Bundestag faction included the 
following words: 
We need [...] to focus the tangled and disjointed international organizations and 
programs. UNEP [UN Environment Programme], CSD [Commission on 
Sustainable Development], and UNDP [UN Development Programme] should be 
merged to form an organization for sustainable development. Close links to the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and 
UNCTAD [UN Conference on Trade and Development] should be aimed for as a 
means of preventing environmental dumping and achieving an environmentally 
sound, sustainable development in line with AGENDA 21. 
(Quoted after: epd-Entwicklungspolitik 5/99) 
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This political development indicates that it is entirely conceivable that the near 
future will experience the launch of negotiations or at least exploratory talks on 
the establishment of a world environment organization.v The past decades and 
years, which have seen the establishment of the UN Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
have demonstrated that the international system is, despite its anarchic 
elements, capable of achieving noteworthy progress in the task of further 
institutionalization (for a comprehensive evaluation cf. Brandt-Report 1980, 
Damrosch 1987, Douglas 1987, Joint Inspection Unit 1995, Nyerere Report 
1991, Palme Report 1989, Reisman 1993, Rosenau 1992, South Centre 1996, 
Tinbergen 1976, Touval 1994, and WCED 1987). The establishment of yet 
another UN specialized agency in charge of integrating existing programs and 
organizations is, even though it may seem unnecessary to some observers, a 
prospect by no means unrealistic. But would an organization of this type be 
desirable? Should political scientists call out to the government; "Stop!" or "Go 
on!"? If it were the latter, the question is: Where, exactly, are we destined for? 
What shape is the new organization to take on? 
This question is interesting not only in practical but also in theoretical terms, in 
that it picks up on some significant problems with which the disciplines of 
international relations and development cooperation have been concerned with 
for decades (cf. CDP 1989, Hardin 1968, Kaul et al. 1999, Miller 1990, 
Rosenau/Czempiel 1992, Streeten 1989, Streeten et al. 1992). What is at issue 
are basic questions of international institutionalization that are exemplified in the 
dispute over the need for a global environmental organization - and the shape it 
ought to be given. In essence, what we find here are three different, opposed 
positions that we will discuss in what follows: 
Hierarchization of international environmental policy (government). This 
maximalist position would state that we need a hierarchical organization of 
environmental policy, which might be achieved through a sovereignty-
impairing world environment organization or an "environmental security 
council" (Section 2). 
Horizontal institutionalization (governance) with or without the establishment 
of a world environment organization as a new element. What these two 
positions have in common is that they reject, or regard as unrealistic, any 
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hierarchization of the international institutional structure in the sphere of 
environmental policy, though they are at odds on whether or not the process 
of horizontal institutionalization (governance) could and should be fostered 
by establishing a non-sovereignty-impairing UN specialized organization. 
The present article supports the latter position (see Section 3). 
In Section 4 we will outline the final shape that might be given to such a non-
sovereignty-impairing UN specialized organization, which, because of the 
development-related component we envisage for it, we would wish to call the 
"World Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)." 
2. REORGANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
THROUGH HIERARCHIZATION: A WORLD ENVIRONMENT ORGANIZATION 
OR ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY COUNDIL (GOVERNMENT)? 
Many representatives of nongovernmental environment organizations (NGOs) 
have been complaining for years that international environmental policy lacks 
clout. The main world-environmental problem is, they go on, the lacking or faulty 
implementation of environmental standards set out in international treaties and 
conference documents. In essence this is a correct statement. But often the 
right evidence is adduced to draw the wrong conclusions, and calls are made 
for unrealistic surges of institutionalization, say, a "World Environment 
Organization" with a hierarchical organizational pattern and the power to 
impose sanctions on individual states, thus curtailing (to a certain degree) the 
sovereignty of all states. Such proposals give preference to the aspect of global 
government over horizontal, nonhierarchical organizational patterns 
(governance).  
In the theoretical debate this has often been termed undesirable - both by 
adherents of neorealism, who regard any and every form of institutionalization 
as unrealistic and unlikely (e.g. Waltz 1959, 1979), and by proponents of 
neoliberal institutionalism, who point to the possibility of governing in the 
international system on the basis of networked problem-specific regimes and 
not through sovereignty-impairing organizations (e.g. Haas et al. 1993, Victor et 
al. 1998, Young 1997). In essence the call for a hierarchical organization of 
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international environmental policy refers back to earlier idealistic notions that 
centered on the chances and conditions of "world federalism" (e.g.....).  
In the meantime, however, the experiences made with international 
environmental policy indicate that, at least in this field, any sovereignty-
impairing hierarchization would run up against strong resistance, in North and 
South alike. True, some ten years ago, as the climate debate was getting 
underway, some 24 countries spoke out in favor of a new authority for the 
protection of the atmosphere that would "involve such decision-making 
procedures as may be effective even if, on occasion, unanimous agreement has 
not been achieved." (The Hague Declaration 1989) Such an authority was to 
have the power to impose sanctions against individual states or a minority of 
states (cf. Sands 1989). Even though some larger countries were involved - 
including Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, and Japan - of the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council only France was willing to sign the Hague 
Declaration. Today it appears unlikely that developing countries like China or 
industrialized countries like the US would be prepared to acquiesce in any 
impairment of their sovereignty in matters of environmental protection. 
We must regard as similarly unrealistic proposals on an “Environmental Security 
Council” (cf. Palmer 1992),vi which the German chancellor Kohl once 
mentioned, though without permitting it to develop into an official position, or the 
proposal to establish an “International Environmental Court” with binding 
jurisdiction (Fues 1997, Zaelke/Cameron 1990). The former proposal would 
require at least  an amendment of the UN Charter, which in turn would require 
ratification by two thirds of UN members as well as by the permanent members 
of the UN Security Council. It seems to us that any extensive restrictions of 
national sovereignty are out of the question in view of the need for a quorum of 
this sort. 
There are also calls to strengthen the sanctioning options of existing 
international institutions, precisely with an eye to a world environment 
organization. Some see the WTO as a model, since under its rules individual 
countries can accuse other countries of violating the GATT (or other trade 
agreements) and force them to appear before a dispute-settlement panel of 
independent trade experts, which de facto takes binding decisions (cf. 
Bhaskar/Glyn 1995, Brenton 1994, Hoffman 1989, and Kenen 1994). But a 
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procedure of this kind would be more than difficult to transfer to a world 
environment organization. 
In the first place, there are technical reasons for not doing so. The parties to the 
WTO are in general parties to the same trade agreements, which would not 
necessarily be the case with membership in a world environment organization. 
True, it would be possible to make membership in a world environment 
organization conditional on ratification of a catalogue of given international 
environmental agreements. But we doubt that any such organization would 
provide incentive enough to ratify an environmental treaty that a country would 
otherwise not have ratified. To this extent an inseparable linkage between 
membership in a world environment organization and ratification of a given 
aquis communautaire would entail the opposite consequences. 
In the second place, effective dispute settlement in trade law resists comparison 
with the case of environmental law. Trade conflicts concern concrete, 
transparent, and universally measurable legal acts of a government - be it the 
level of tariffs, import and export regulations, or technical standards for 
domestic manufacturing facilities. The GATT/WTO dispute-settlement panels 
are designed to prevent one country from creatively shaping its trade 
regulations with an eye to deriving unwarranted benefits at the expense of other 
countries. Even though environment-related conflicts over the appropriateness 
of legal acts may occur, the problem posed by the global ecological crisis is in 
fact far more complex in terms of its causes and consequences. Many 
international environmental agreements entail no transparent, concrete 
obligations on states that could be as easily quantified as an export tariff. And 
even where there are measurable indicators, the subordinate priority given to 
the environment on the domestic policy agenda of most countries casts doubts 
on their willingness to implement decisions of dispute-settlement panels.  
Equipping a future world environment organization with powerful enforcement 
mechanisms would prove practicable only vis-à-vis those countries that even 
today see themselves faced with the threat of "eco-imperialism": the developing 
countries (see Agarwal/Narain 1991, Miller 1995, Sachs 1993). It is precisely 
with regard to developing countries that a world environment organization with 
"sharp teeth" could prove counterproductive. In order to dodge the ecological 
enforcement pressure of  industrialized countries, developing countries would 
either refrain from joining or fight to water down given environmental standards 
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and refuse to accept any more stringent standards. This of course would be no 
great service to the environment. 
3. HORIZONTAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION (GOVERNANCE) WITH OR WITHOUT 
A NEW WORLD ORGANIZATION AS AN ADDITIONAL ELEMENT 
As indicated, the maximalist solution of a hierarchization of international 
environmental policy in the form of a sovereignty-impairing world environment 
organization seems unrealistic. Effective international environmental policy 
seems possible only via horizontal institutionalization. Still, the question is 
whether the existing governance structures of environmental policy should 
remain the way they are or whether there is need to widen them to include a 
new non-sovereignty-impairing world environment organization - perhaps along 
the lines of the World Health Organization (WHO). 
In what follows we will discuss this issue with reference to three essential 
functions of international environmental policy, which, in our view, are not 
adequately performed by the existing governance structures: (a) coordination of 
the increasingly fragmented international institutional system, (b) the system's 
capacity-building and financial functions, in particular as regards North-South 
cooperation, and (c) implementation and further development of international 
environmental law (concern-building, improving the contractual environment).vii 
(a) Better coordination of the international institutional system by integrating 
certain of its functions into a new organization 
The international institutional system displays, first and foremost, shortcomings 
in coordination that lead to substantial (albeit as yet not  fully quantified) costs 
and suboptimal policy results (cf. Brown et al. 2000, Brown-Weiss 1989, 
Commission on Global Governance 1995, IPCC 1996, Jänicke et al. 1996, 
Keohane/Levy 1996, and Ostrom 1991). UNEP, founded in 1972, was for a time 
a comparatively autonomous actor with a clearly defined set of functions. The 
proliferation of international environmental agreements, however, led to an 
extensive fragmentation of the system, particularly in that newly created 
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convention secretariats have, in part for political reasons, not been integrated 
into UNEP. This set the stage for an unfolding of strong particularist interests, a 
development which has not proven especially conducive to a coordinated 
approach to international environmental policy. For instance, there is very little 
coordination between climate policy, biodiversity policy, and desertification 
policy (WBGU 1996). Independent secretariats and advisory boards have been 
set up for each of these policy fields, which has led to de facto specialized 
agencies, each with an agenda of its own. The practice, provided for in the 
Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, of crediting 
greenhouse-gas sinks could, for example, create incentives in forest policy that 
run counter to the goals of international biodiversity policy in that this protocol 
rewards as a pro-climate measure the clearance of (species-rich) primary 
forests and a subsequent reforestation with (nondiverse but fast-growing) 
plantations (WCMC 1994). 
The funding of the new environmental conventions with North-South relevance 
has in part been integrated into the World Bank in the form of the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), in part transferred to independent sectoral funds 
(Biermann 1998, Biermann/Simonis 1999). In addition, various UN specialized 
agencies (like WHO and FAO) have become active in the field of environmental 
protection, while UNEP, a relatively small organization, has been unable to  
develop a really effective standard-setting and program-building force of its 
own. 
This problem has long been recognized. Attempts have been made to network 
individual organizations, programs, and offices since 1972, when a first 
coordination board was set up within the United Nations.viii This board and its 
successors, however, failed to overcome the particularist interests of individual 
departments, programs, and convention secretariats, and the result has been a 
fragmentation of the international institutional system that has rendered it 
comparatively ineffective and inefficient. The ongoing debate since the 1992 Rio 
conference on institutional reform led to one more subcommission of the UN 
Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Sustainable Development 
(CSD). Beside UNEP, the convention secretariats, and the relevant UN 
specialized agencies, the CSD has developed into a forum for discourse, but 
not one in which decisions are taken. It has proven not to be adequate to the 
cross-sectoral functions that many had foreseen for it. Its representatives 
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include ministers responsible for development and the environment, but not 
their colleagues with the portfolios for financial, economic, and foreign affairs. 
In short, in the field of environmental policy the international institutional system 
has, since 1972, been marked by a high level of organizational fragmentation. 
This system lacks a focal point of the kind defined by, say, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). There are 
overlaps in the functions and duties of nearly all of these institutions. 
Coordination - if there is any at all - is an ad hoc affair, with individual signatory 
conferences meeting with UN organizations or among themselves to hammer 
out arrangements on coordination and cooperation. 
For this reason there appears to be an urgent need for an institutional center in 
charge of an international sustainability strategy. Just as, in the 1970s and 
1980s, autonomous environment ministries were established at the national 
level with an eye to strengthening the policy field of environmental protection, 
the goal now should be to further institutionalize the field of international 
environmental policy by setting up an independent specialized organization with 
a view to minimizing the particularist interests of individual programs and offices 
and limiting double work, overlaps, and inconsistencies. It would appear both 
practicable and simple in organizational terms to set up an independent UN 
specialized organization with a legal personality, a budget, and funding sources 
of its own, a development which would have to be accompanied by (1) the 
dissolution and transfer of UNEP, CSD, and GEF, (2) an integration of the 
larger convention secretariats, and (3) a redefinition of the functions of the 
remaining environmental and developmental organizations, programs, and 
offices. 
(b) Capacity-building in the South and financial and technology transfers 
Several years ago the term capacity-building became a new catchword of 
development cooperation (AGENDA 21 1992, Jänicke et al. 1996). Seen in 
empirical terms, the building of capacity, particularly in developing countries, is 
apt to be one of the essential functions of environmental regimes as well (cf. 
Friedheim 1999, Keohane 1984, Keohane et al. 1993, Korton 1990, Krasner 
1983, and Wagner 1997). Financial and technical cooperation on environmental 
problems nevertheless differs from traditional development cooperation: in 
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particular the transfers effected by the Multilateral Ozone Fund or the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) serve not only to build environmental capacities in 
the South, they also provide compensation for the full 'agreed' incremental costs 
incurred by developing countries in connection with global environmental policy 
- in accordance with the principle of the 1992 Rio conference on "common but 
differentiated responsibilities and capabilities" of the parties (see 
Biermann/Simonis 1999, Sand 1994, WBGU 1999,). In this context, Hans Peter 
Schipulle, division head of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, noted: 
Unlike classical development aid [...], these transfers, effected by environmental 
conventions, are obligations that are binding under international law [...]. If these 
obligations are not met by the industrialized countries, the developing countries 
can advance this as grounds for not meeting their own obligations, which in turn 
would harm the interests of the international community, i.e. including the 
industrialized countries. [These stipulations] become national law when the 
Convention is ratified and thus constitutes a new legal frame of reference for the 
cooperation with developing countries." (Schipulle 1997: 236f.; our translation).  
This new frame of reference is mirrored in the parity-based North-South 
decision-making procedure of the GEF and the Ozone Fund as well as in the 
fact that the otherwise customary donor-recipient terminology has given way to 
the notion of "partnership." 
However, even here the international institutional system suffers from an ad hoc 
approach that fails to live up to the standards of transparency, effectiveness, 
and participation of those affected - and the need for financial and technology 
transfers from North to South in connection with international environmental 
policy will continue to grow: This is why the industrialized countries have agreed 
to refund developing countries for their incremental costs not only in ozone 
policy but presumably also in climate policy, if the latter commit themselves to 
quantitative emission-reduction targets for greenhouse gases in the coming 
decades. There is a similar arrangement in the making for the future costs of 
biodiversity policy in the South (Biermann 1998: Chapters 5-7), and also for the 
transfers aimed at combating desertification as well as the anticipated transfer 
obligations aimed at limiting releases of persistent organic pollutants (POPs). 
Moreover, the future international trade in emission certificates in connection 
with climate protection (Simonis 1996b) - perhaps initially in the form of the 
"clean development mechanism" decided on in Kyoto in 1997 - will require solid 
institutional underpinning. 
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These new and extended functional requirements of the international 
institutional system can, in our opinion, not be met by the present institutional 
setting. 
- One conceivable approach would be the proliferation of further special 
funds like the Multilateral Ozone Fund, which was set up in 1990 
specifically for this one environmental problem (cf. Benedick 1998). But 
any such further fragmentation of the institutional system would appear 
counterproductive and should therefore be avoided (cf.Sand 1994). 
- A second approach would be to transfer all these tasks of global 
environmental protection to the World Bank. This the developing countries 
would, in all likelihood, resist, since they regard the World Bank, with its 
contribution-dependent decision-making procedure, as heavily dominated 
by the North. 
- A third approach would be to transfer the task of improving the capacity-
building, funding, and compensation functions of the international 
institutional system through an independent organization that pays more 
attention to the special needs of international environmental policy than 
does the World Bank and is at the same time capable of overcoming the 
system's fragmentation. Such a new organization would be able to 
coordinate different funding mechanisms and to administer the resources 
of the sectoral funds on a trust basis, which would also mean integrating 
the GEF into it (and thus disbanding it). This proposal might well find the 
acceptance of the industrialized countries if the new organization were 
provided with a decision-making procedure that is in fact equivalent to that 
of the GEF (an issue which we will look at in more detail further below). 
As far as funding is concerned, a new world organization would also offer the 
possibility to fundamentally revamp the international system, viz. to introduce 
"quasi-automatic funding mechanisms." Nearly all funding mechanisms that 
have been used to date suffer from the voluntary nature of contributions, and 
even in cases in which there are contractually fixed membership contributions, 
we find again and again that payments are politically instrumentalized or made 
conditional on the given economic situation. As the theory of collective goods 
indicates, the funding of community tasks is systematically undercut by free 
riders, and in consequence at the national level community tasks are not funded 
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on a voluntary basis but financed through taxes.ix This is the point of departure 
of the ongoing debate on quasi-automatic funding mechanisms in international 
environmental policy. 
The financial needs of environmental policy are obviously substantial. The 
secretariat of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development 
estimated that, taken together, the conference's action program "AGENDA 21" - 
which was worked out by mutual consent of the parties to the conference - 
would require a total annual volume of 125 billion US$ in financial aid to the 
developing countries, a volume in dimensions higher than the current two-billion 
budget of the GEF, through which the industrialized countries transfer their 
support for climate, biodiversity, and marine-protection policies in the South. 
Since early on in the debate, international taxes on environmentally harmful 
activities have been discussed as regards ozone policy (CFC tax) and climate 
policy (carbon tax). At present the debate revolves around the Tobin tax on 
foreign-exchange transactions, which found the support of former French 
president Mitterand (at the Copenhagen World Social Summit), as well as an 
international charge on air traffic. The latter possibility had been addressed by 
former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in the Agenda for Peace as a 
means of funding peacekeeping activities (UNSG 1992). Since collecting an 
international charge on air traffic would not entail undue verification costs (it 
could, for instance, be collected together with the customary airport tax), it 
would appear practicable. A comparatively low tax rate may ensure that it would 
not result in any major distortions of competition and rerouting or relocation of 
air traffic. An additional source of funding might be sought in a rededication of 
debt instruments from developing countries for use by the new organization (a 
global debt-for-nature swap, as it were) as well as a dedicated use of the 
revenues from the (planned) trade in emission certificates provided for in the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
Of course such quasi-automatic funding mechanisms could also be introduced 
without any global environment organization, just as it would be possible to 
establish a global organization without endowing it with automatic funding 
mechanisms. Still, the one is inseparably linked to the other: quasi-automatic 
funding mechanisms require an appropriate institutional structure, and it is 
precisely in the case of environment-related taxes that a UN organization would 
be an actor particularly well suited to the task of a fair collection and 
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administration of the funds. By the same token, quasi-automatic funding 
mechanisms would provide the new organization with the means it needs to 
discharge its tasks, in particular capacity-building in developing countries (for 
more on this see below). 
(c) Implementation and further development of international environmental 
law 
As discussed above, it would be a mistake to think in terms of equipping a world 
environment organization with strong enforcement mechanisms, or for that 
matter even to call for them publicly. Any such institutional reform would 
backfire, resulting in a setback for international environmental policy. Instead of 
"sharp teeth" the organization should have "softer" enforcement mechanisms, 
which research in political science has shown to be appropriate and auspicious. 
The organization should, for instance, have the right to collect, evaluate, and 
publish in a suitable form information on the state of the environment and on the 
state of environmental policy in the UN member states, especially with regard to 
the international commitments assumed by individual states. As Marc A. Levy 
(1993) showed with reference to the European clean-air regime, clear 
comparative information on individual countries (the "leaders") can give rise to 
important political initiatives in less ecology-minded countries (the "laggards"). 
Like most other specialized agencies of the United Nations, a world 
environment organization should therefore foster problem consciousness and 
seek to improve the state of the world's knowledge, including information on the 
earth system and existing environmental and development problems as well as 
information on the state of implementation of international and national policy 
with a view to controlling global change (see Schellnhuber/Wenzel 1998). Of 
course it is unnecessary to reinvent the wheel: all recent environmental 
conventions have obliged the parties to report regularly on their policy-related 
activities. Specialized organizations like the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), or the World Health 
Organization (WHO) collect and disseminate valuable information and promote 
further research; the CSD provides important contributions in designing 
indicators of sustainable development. And UNEP, not least, is active in many 
of these areas. 
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Yet what we still lack is a comprehensive coordination, focusing, and decision-
oriented processing of this knowledge. The data and programs currently 
elaborated by various international actors is in need of a fixed point in the 
institutional system. In theory UNEP could be this fixed point, but the present 
resources and competences of this program, which operates under the UN 
General Assembly, are not adequate. This would be more a task for a world 
environment organization endowed with sufficient funds and independent in 
institutional terms. 
Such an organization would also have more possibilities to support regime-
building processes ("improving the contractual environment"; see Keohane et 
al. 1993), particularly by initiating and preparing international treaties. The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) might serve as a model here. Using a 
predefined procedure, it has worked out a body of "ILO conventions" which 
constitute a kind of global labor code. Compared with the ILO, however, 
environmental policy is, in terms of regime formation, far more disparate and 
marked by competence-related disputes between various UN specialized 
agencies in which UNEP has been unable to hold its own. 
4. OUTLINE OF A "WORLD ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION" 
In conclusion, establishing a non-sovereignty-impairing world environment 
organization as an added element of a horizontally organized governance 
structure in environmental policy would thus appear to be a promising 
endeavour. An organization of this sort could be set up - independently of UN 
quorums - at a diplomatic conference and come into force for its members only. 
In legal terms it could even become active without China (as the WTO did) or 
without the United States (which has pulled out of several specialized UN 
organizations, and must in any case be seen as rather aloof from the United 
Nations). 
In essence, the new organization should fulfill the three above-named functions, 
i.e. it should: (1) integrate and better coordinate international environmental 
policy, (2) build and finance capacities in the developing countries, and (3) 
contribute to a better implementation and further development of international 
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environmental law. But what concrete shape could, should be given to such an 
organization? We wish to throw some light on three problems in this second 
step of our line of argument: (a) the demarcation of "environment" and 
"development", (b) the decision-making procedure, and (c) the integration of 
private actors. 
(a) Demarcation of "environment" and "development" 
The main reason why a new UN specialized organization appears to be needed 
is the dysfunctional fragmentation of the international institutional system in the 
field of environmental policy. This is where the focal point of its functions should 
lie. But internationally it is nonetheless important not to view environmental 
protection in isolation. Political agreements and programs, for instance on 
regulating the consumption of fossil fuels (the Climate Convention) or protecting 
tropical forests (the Biodiversity Convention), inevitably affect core economic 
and development-related issues. A world environment organization must take 
this into account. It need not foster development as such, as is attempted by the 
UN Development Programme (UNDP), but it must not run counter to 
development, either. Its policy should ensure that poverty alleviation and 
economic development in the South are not jeopardized and that international 
environmental policy is or gets in line with the criterion of a globally equitable 
burden-sharing. This is why it is essential that this - as in the case of the 1992 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development - should be fully reflected in 
the organization's name: "World Environment and Development Organization 
(WEDO)”. 
Some might ask for a higher level of integration here: the amalgamation of 
UNEP and UNDP - which, in view of UNDP's budget, would amount to a 
mammoth union in the family of international institutions. Industrialized countries 
have long been opposed to any international organization for development 
issues, so that any upgrading of UNDP and UNEP, while advocated by the 
South, is apt to encounter rejection on the part of most industrialized countries. 
On the other hand, many industrialized countries might come to like a UNDP-
UNEP synthesis, if this proved to be a way to cut the UN's overall development-
related budget expenditures, i.e. if amalgamation means savings. The former 
UNDP administrator, James Gustave Speth, called in principle for a world 
environment organization, though he spoke out against any amalgamation with 
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his own organization (Speth 1996, 1998)x. Similar resistance must be 
anticipated from his successor, and should, in view of the weight carried by 
UNDP, not be underrated. One main problem is the project character of UNDP's 
work which is different from UNEP's structure. Another factor is the substantial 
size difference between UNEP and UNDP. Both aspects might well hobble the 
policy-stimulating and cooperation-fostering effects of a new organization 
against the background of UNDP's development-related project work. 
To this extent it could, at present,  be more wise to refrain from amalgamating 
UNEP and UNDP to form a new organization, with UNDP continuing its work. 
But it would all the same be necessary to add the term development to the title 
of the new organization. The double, integrative term "environment and 
development" picks up on the 1992 Rio conference and the Rio Declaration, 
illustrating that environmental policy implies no structural restraints on the 
economic development of the South.  
This in turn would imply inclusion of a number of principles of international 
environmental policy, such as the "common but differentiated responsibilities 
and capabilities" of the parties, the principle of obligations differentiated 
between North and South, and the principle of compensation for the South's 
incremental environmental costs. A pure "World Environment Organization" 
would at present certainly be rejected by most of the developing countries - 
though the proposal for a "World Environment and Development Organization" 
might, hopefully, open the door to a compromise between North and South.xi 
(b) Decision-making procedure 
Institutions lower the transaction costs of the international system by providing 
proven and reliable decision-making procedures (Keohane 1984). A World 
Environment and Development Organization could thus contribute to coming to 
terms with the power configurations specific to environmental policy by 
establishing a unique decision-making process which would, independently of 
individual regimes, initiate, coordinate, and accompany an international 
sustainability strategy of North and South. Even though consensus is gaining 
ground in day-to-day UN affairs, the actual structure of voting rights in 
committees and commissions is still essential. In many international 
organizations special tasks and problems have led to very specific decision-
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making procedures. Various elements of these different procedures could 
uniquely be combined for a World Environment and Development Organization 
in order to ensure its overall effectiveness and acceptance. 
Decision-making procedures would certainly be appropriate that provide North 
and South with equal rights. This could prove to be a means of ensuring that the 
decisions taken by the new world organization on its strategy and program were 
compatible with the interests of both the developing countries and the 
industrialized countries. Decisions-making procedures based on North-South 
parity are, in essence, a "third way" between the South-oriented decision-
making procedure of the UN General Assembly (one country, one vote) and the 
North-oriented procedure of the Bretton Woods institutions (one dollar, one 
vote).  
As early as 1990 it was stipulated for the ozone regime (and the Multilateral 
Ozone Fund) that every decision taken should require a two-thirds vote of the 
parties, including a simple majority of the developing countries and a simple 
majority of the industrialized countries (Benedick 1998). The procedure adopted 
for the reformed Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 1994 is in effect similar.xii 
One problematical aspect of strictly parity-based procedures, however, is the 
definition of group association. Singapore, for instance, has a higher per capita 
income than many industrialized countries, though it - as a member of the 
Group of 77 - continues to be regarded as a developing country. The ozone 
regime  is marked by a problem-specific graduation procedure: If a developing 
country consumes more than 300 grams of CFCs per capita and annum, it is 
classified as an industrialized country. It is then required to meet the North's 
stricter reduction criteria and is included in the group of the industrialized 
countries in parity-based votes (Biermann 1998: Chapter 5). A case-specific 
graduation of this kind would, however, not seem to be appropriate for a World 
Environment and Development Organization which is to be responsible for a 
whole complex of environmental problems. A second-best option would be the 
self-definition of the parties, as in the case of UNCTAD or the UN General 
Assembly; developing countries that join the OECD (as Mexico and South-
Korea did years ago) for instance are expected to comply with the 
environmental obligations of the industrialized countries. 
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In addition it would be worth considering to what extent a parity-based North-
South procedure could be broken down into a multiple-parity procedure. If, for 
instance, four groups - "Western industrialized countries" (with a temporary 
subgroup of "countries in transition to market economy"), "newly industrial 
countries" (NICs), "developing countries," and "least developed countries" 
(LLDCs) were formed, it would be practicable to base decisions of the World 
Environment and Development Organization on consent of the majority of the 
members of these four groups. A further subdivision into groups with and 
without a veto could, on the other hand, impair the effectiveness of the decision-
making process. 
(c) Integration of private actors 
The ongoing discussion, both public and in the social sciences, has focused on 
the new role of nongovernmental actors, on civil society and, in our context, on 
transnational environmental and business organizations (e.g. Anheier/Salamon 
1998, Union of International Associations 1999, Wapner 1997, Werksman 
1996). These NGOs not only exert considerable pressure on politics, they also 
offer, in a world of growing complexity, a number of "services" in the 
international system: they may supply favorably priced research and policy 
advice by qualified and (privately funded) staff members, monitor the mutual 
obligations of countries in a way that would be impossible for government 
agencies due to the ban on intervention under international law, and they do 
inform governments and the public on international negotiations, both on the 
activities of "one's own" diplomats and on those of the other negotiating parties. 
In addition, transnational environmental and business organizations can 
constitute effective feedback mechanisms between government representatives 
at diplomatic conferences and the situation at home (Raustiala 1997). For these 
reasons it is widely accepted that NGOs should be granted a greater say in 
international negotiations and policy formulation. 
However, we find two troublesome areas that encumber the international 
community of private actors. On the one hand, the private environment groups 
active at UN conferences and signatory conferences are dominated by 
organizations of the North, from which they obtain their funding and, for the 
most part, their personnel (for a critical view, see South Centre 1996: 212ff.). 
This may influence the agendas of these groups, even though in practice 
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attempts are often made to maintain modes of North-South parity in the internal 
coordination between transnational environmental and developmental 
organizations. When the hearing rights of such organizations at diplomatic 
conferences are at issue, it is mostly the governments of the developing 
countries that prevent any further-reaching rights for private actors (in part due 
to internal democracy deficits). A second problem is that the financial power of 
the business organizations may decisively dilute genuine environmental 
interests. 
One possible solution to these problems would be to institutionalize the 
collaboration of private actors in such a way as to ensure that the votes of North 
and South and business and environmental interests are balanced. A precedent 
here is the decision-making procedure of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) which accords four votes to every member state, two to the government 
and one each to the employer organizations and the labor unions. The 
environmental and developmental organizations from the South would 
accordingly have a voting majority in the new organization (keyed to the size of 
the population they represent), and the interests of industry and ecology would 
be equally represented.  
Certain problems could emerge in transferring this procedure to the new 
organization, however. In environmental and developmental affairs there are 
few organizations that fully represent their overall national clientele. But 
effective coalitions (like, for instance, the German Forum Umwelt und 
Entwicklung) could very well emerge in the near future - indeed, this could be 
promoted by anchoring a representation of voting NGOs from both camps in the 
statute of the World Environment and Development Organization. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
If we are to achieve an international environmental and developmental policy 
capable of ensuring sustainability in and for the 21st century, it will be 
necessary to widen the family of UN specialized organizations and to include a 
new member responsible for the policy field of sustainable development. 
Disparate, poorly coordinated units in the existing international institutional 
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system could in this way be fused and on the whole invigorated. In our opinion 
the UN Environment Programme, the UN Commission for Sustainable 
Development, the Global Environment Facility, the secretariats of the major 
environmental conventions (such as climate, biodiversity, desertification 
convention and the law of the seas) and – probably – the UN Development 
Programme should be amalgamated in a new organization, the World 
Environment and Development Organization. Such an organization could lend 
the urgent tasks of environmental and developmental policy more weight among 
national governments, international organizations, and private actors alike. In 
addition, this would make it possible to strengthen the action capacity of the 
developing countries through enlarged financial and technical support. And 
furthermore, this would enable the international community to improve the 
institutional setting for negotiating new agreements and action programs and for 
implementing existing ones. 
A World Environment and Development Organization could on the one hand be 
funded through contributions from the industrialized countries, and the savings 
effected by integrating existing programs and convention secretariats into it. A 
second approach to funding would be to rededicate debt instruments of the 
developing countries for the purposes of the new organization (enlarged debt-
for sustainable development swaps). A third and major approach would be to 
introduce quasi-automatic funding mechanisms, above all a Tobin tax on cross-
border financial transactions and an international air-traffic charge, and to 
harness (parts of) the revenues stemming from the planned trade in emission 
certificates in international climate policy. 
As regards decision-making, the World Environment and Development 
Organization could gain the largest possible acceptance by introducing a parity-
based North-South decision-making procedure conceived along the lines of the 
ozone regime (Multilateral Ozone Fund) and the reformed Global Environment 
Facility (GEF). This would mean that both a majority of the developing countries 
and a majority of the industrialized countries would have a group veto on 
decisions. The growing influence of private actors in global governance should 
be institutionalized in the organization, in this way improving equal opportunity. 
We would therefore propose voting rights for representatives of environment 
and business organizations on the model of the ILO. In this way every country 
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would have four votes: two for the government, one for environmental and 
developmental organizations, and one for business associations. 
No doubt an organization of this sort will seem unrealistic or untimely to many 
people. But the establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC) also 
appeared unrealistic just ten years ago. In the present essay we have sought to 
justify the need for a World Environment and Development Organization. At 
least France, Germany, and Japan now appear to embrace a positive attitude 
toward a new UN specialized organization. Thus far the developing countries 
tend to be either silent or more or less skeptical. But we think the organization 
outlined here could soon prove acceptable for a  larger group of countries. 
Representatives of the South may ask whether a World Environment and 
Development Organization should be preferred or whether a global environment 
organization of Daniel Esty's type would turn out to be more suitable. We, of 
course, are inclined to believe that  the proposal advanced here has the best 
chance to be implemented. 
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NOTES 
 
i  I t  w i l l  n o t  b e  p o s s i b l e  t o  p r o v i d e  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  o v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e  h e r e ;  s e e  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  r e p o r t s  i n  E l l i o t  ( 1 9 9 8 ) ,  W e r k s m a n  
( 1 9 9 6 ) ,  Y o u n g  ( 1 9 9 7 ) ,  a n d ,  t o  s i n g l e  ou t  a  f ew  f o r  t he  Ge rman -
s p e a k i n g  w o r l d ,  B i e r m a n n  ( 1 9 9 8 ) ,  G e h r i n g  ( 1 9 9 4 ) ,  R i t t b e r g e r  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,  
a n d  S i m o n i s  ( 1 9 9 6 a ) .  
ii  O n  N o v e m b e r  3 ,  1 9 9 8 ,  P r e s i d e n t  C h i r a c ,  a t  a  c o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  W o r l d  
C o n s e r v a t i o n  U n i o n ,  s p o k e  o f  t h e  n e e d  f o r  a  " w o r l d  a u t h o r i t y "  a s  a n  
" i m p a r t i a l  a n d  i n d i s p u t a b l e  g l o b a l  c e n t e r  f o r  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  o u r  
env i r onmen t "  (Ch i r ac  1998 ) .  
iii  C h a n c e l l o r  K o h l ' s  s t a t e m e n t  b e f o r e  t h e  1 9 9 7  s p e c i a l  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  U N  
G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y  -  t h e  " R i o -p l us - f i v e  S u m m i t  " -  inc luded the  fo l low ing  
w o r d s :  " [ . . . ]  g l o b a l  en v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  a n d  s u s t a i n a b l e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  n e e d  a  c l e a r l y  a u d i b l e  v o i c e  a t  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  t h e  s h o r t  t e r m ,  I  t h i n k  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  c o o p e r a t i o n  
a m o n g  t h e  v a r i o u s  e n v i r o n m e n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  b e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
i m p r o v e d .  I n  t h e  m e d i u m  t e r m  t h i s  s h o u l d  l e a d  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  
g l o b a l  u m b r e l l a  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i s s u e s ,  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  
N a t i o n s  E n v i r o n m e n t  P r o g r a m m e  a s  a  m a j o r  p i l l a r "  (D e u t s c h l a n d  
1 9 9 7 ) .  T h i s  w a s  i n  e f f e c t  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  J o i n t  D e c l a r a t i o n  o f  B r a z i l ,  
G e r m a n y ,  S i n g a p o r e ,  a n d  S o u t h  A f r i c a  o f  J u n e  2 3 ,  1 9 9 7 ,  a t  t h e  s a m e  
s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  U N  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y .  
iv   T h e  G e r m a n  A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l  o n  G l o b a l  C h a n g e  l i k e w i s e  
r e c o m m e n d e d  a n  " o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  s u s t a i n a b l e  d e v e l o p m e n t , "  b u t  
w i t h o u t ,  a t  t h i s  j u n c t u r e ,  s p e l l i n g  ou t  a n y  s p e c i f i c s  ( W B G U  1 9 9 6 ) .  
v   O n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  U N  r e f o r m  d e b a t e ,  s e e  U N S G  ( 1 9 9 8 ) .  T h e  
U N  T a s k  F o r c e  o n  E n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  H u m a n  S e t t l e m e n t s  r e c o m m e n d e d  
s e t t i n g  u p  a n  " E n v i r o n m e n t a l  M a n a g e m e n t  G r o u p "  u n d e r  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
o f  U N E P  a s  a  m e a n s  o f  b e t t e r  c o o r d i n a t i n g  t h e  w o r k  o f  s e c r e t a r i a t s ,  
d e p a r t m e n t s ,  a n d  a g e n c i e s .  
v i  T o w a r d  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  N e w  Z e a l a n d  p r o p o s e d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
o f  a n  " E n v i r o n m e n t a l  P r o t e c t i o n  C o u n c i l "  t h a t  w a s  l i k e w i s e  t o  b e  
e m p o w e r e d  t o  t a k e  b i n d i n g  d e c i s i o n s  ( G e n e r a l  D e b a t e S t a t e m e n t  a t  
t h e  4 4 t h  S e s s i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y ,  2 n d  
O c t o b e r  1 9 8 9 ;  S t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  H o n o u r a b l e  G e o f f r e y  P a l m e r ,  P r i m e  
M in i s t e r  o f  New  Zea land ) .  
vii  S e e  H a a s / K e o h a n e / L e v y  ( 1 9 9 3 )  o n  t h e  t h r e e  ' c ' s  o f  s u c c e s s f u l  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g i m e s .  A  f o u r t h  ' c '  t o  t h i s  m o d e l  m a y  b e  a d d e d :  
c o m p l i a n c e  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h i s  l a s t  f u n c t i o n  w o u l d ,  h o w e v e r ,  c o n t i n u e  
t o  b e  t h e  t a s k  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  e v e n  a f t e r  
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t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  w o r l d  e n v i r o n m e n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  s i n c e  a  
c e n t r a l i z e d  c o m p l i a n c e  m a n a g e m e n t  a p p e a r s  u n r e a l i s t i c  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  
g r e a t  n u m b e r  o f  r e g i m e s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t i e s ;  i t s  p o l i c y  r e s u l t s  w o u l d  
d o u b t l e s s  a l s o  b e  o f  p o o r e r  q u a l i t y .  
viii  F o l l o w i n g  t h e  1 9 7 2  S t o c k h o l m  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  t h e  H u m a n  E n v i r o n m e n t ,  
an  i ndependen t  o f f i c e ,  t h e  “ E n v i r o n m e n t  C o o r d i n a t i o n  B o a r d ” ,  w a s  
c r e a t e d ;  i t  w a s  d i s b a n d e d  i n  1 9 7 7 .  S i n c e  t h e n  t h e  U N ' s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
p o l i c y  h a s  b e e n  c o o r d i n a t e d  b y  t h e  g e n e r a l  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  C o m m i t t e e  
on  Co-o r d i n a t i o n  ( A C C )  a n d  i n  p a r t  b y  U N E P .  K l a u s  T ö p f e r ,  U N E P ' s  
c u r r e n t  e x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r ,  n o w  s e e m s  t o  i n t e n d  t o  s e t  u p  a n  
" E n v i r o n m e n t a l  M a n a g e m e n t  G r o u p "  u n d e r  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  U N E P  w i t h  
a n  e y e  t o  b e i n g  b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  t h e  w o r k  o f  t h e  s e c r e t a r i a t s ,  
d e p a r t m e n t s ,  a n d  a g e n c i e s .  
ix  S e e  a l s o  t h e  r e p o r t  o f  " T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  W o r k i n g  G r o u p  o n  t h e  F u t u r e  
o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s , "  h e a d e d  b y  f o r m e r  P a k i s t a n i  p r i m e  m i n i s t e r  
M o e e n  Q u r e s h i  a n d  f o r m e r  G e r m a n  p r e s i d e n t  R i c h a r d  v o n  W e i z s ä c k e r  
( 1 9 9 5 ) .   
x  " I  t h i n k  i t  i s  v e r y  t i m e l y  t o  b e  t h i n k i n g  a b o u t  h o w  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  U N  
i n  b o t h e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a n d  l i n k i n g  t h e  t w o .  M a j o r  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n n o v a t i o n s  a r e  n e e d e d  i n  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a r e a ,  b u t  
p e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  i s  t o  d r a m a t i c a l l y  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  U N  
E n v i r o n m e n t  P r o g r a m m e .  M y  o w n  v i e w  i s  t h a t  U N E P  s h o u l d  e v o l v e  i n t o  
a  w o r l d  e n v i r o n m e n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  I  t h i n k  a  n e w  n a m e  m i g h t  b e  u s e f u l ,  
b e c a u s e  i t  w o u l d  s y m b o l i z e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s o m e t h i n g  n e w  h a d  c o m e  i n t o  
b e i n g .  T h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w h i c h  I  t h i n k  i s  n e e d e d  i s  o n e  t h a t  w o u l d  d e a l  
w i t h  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  a n a l y s i s ,  m o n i t o r i n g  t r e n d s  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  e a r l y  
w a r n i n g ,  f r a m i n g  a g r e e m e n t s  a n d  b u i l d i n g  c o n s e n s u s  f o r  a c t i o n .  S o  w e  
n e e d  a  W o r l d  O r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  E n v i r o n m e n t  t h a t  i s  a s  s t r o n g  a n d  a s  
e f f e c t i v e  a s  t h e  W o r l d  T r a d e  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  w h e r e  t h e  t r a d e  m i n i s t e r s  
w o r k  t o g e t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y ,  o r  a s  t h e  W o r l d  H e a l t h  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  
w h e r e  t h e  h e a l t h  m i n i s t e r s  w o r k  t o g e t h e r .  W e  n e e d  a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
t h a t  b r i n g s  a l l  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  m i n i s t e r s  o f  t h e  w o r l d  t o g e t h e r  f o r  
c o n c e r t e d  a c t i o n .  I  h o p e  t h a t  U N E P  c a n  e v o l v e  i n t o  a  w o r l d  
e n v i r o n m e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  t y p e  t h a t  I  d e s c r i b e d . "  ( S p e t h  1 9 9 8 )  
xi  T h i s  j u d g m e n t  i s  b a s e d ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  o n  s e v e r a l  e x p e r t  
s e m i n a r s  a t  t h e  S c h o o l  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t u d i e s ,  J a w a h a r l a l  N e h r u  
U n i v e r s i t y ,  N e w  D e l h i ,  i n  J a n u a r y  a n d  F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 9 .  
xii  S i n c e  1 9 9 4  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  G E F  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  C o u n c i l  h a v e  r e q u i r e d  
a  t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  t h a t  m u s t  b e  m a d e  u p  o f  6 0  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r i e s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  t h e  f a c i l i t y  a n d  6 0  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  f a c i l i t y .  T h i s  i s  i n  e f f e c t  a  p r o c e d u r e  b a s e d  o n  
Nor t h -S o u t h  p a r i t y ,  o n e  t h a t  a c c o r d s  a n  e f f e c t i v e  v e t o  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  a n d  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  a l i k e .  
 
